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OPINION OF THE COURT 
______ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises out of the 2008 death of Frederick 
Viera (“Viera”) in a head-on motorcycle accident.  At the 
time of his death, Viera was covered under an employer-
provided accidental death and dismemberment policy 
(“Policy”), issued by Life Insurance Company of America 
(“LINA”), and subject to the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (“ERISA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.  Viera‟s 
wife and the executrix of his estate, Hetty Viera (“Plaintiff”), 
submitted a claim under the Policy following his death.  
LINA denied Plaintiff‟s claim, both initially and on appeal.  
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Subsequently, Plaintiff filed suit, but the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found 
for LINA on cross-motions for summary judgment.  It 
concluded that the Policy gave LINA discretionary authority 
to determine eligibility.  It therefore reviewed LINA‟s 
decision under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard and 
held that LINA was entitled to summary judgment.  We 
conclude that deferential review was not appropriate, given 
the language of the Policy, and thus remand for further 
proceedings. 
I. 
 A. Factual History 
 On October 14, 2008, Viera was seriously injured in a 
motorcycle accident in Grand Junction, Colorado.  He was 
treated at St. Mary‟s Hospital and Medical Center (“St. 
Mary‟s”) for approximately three hours and subsequently 
died. 
 On the date of his death, Viera maintained the Policy, 
an employer-provided accidental death and dismemberment 
policy regulated under ERISA.
1
  The Policy was issued and 
administered by LINA. 
                                                 
1
 Viera also had an employer-provided life insurance 
policy at the time of his death.  Plaintiff received $350,000 
from LINA on account of this claim. 
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 Viera had a pre-existing chronic condition known as 
atrial fibrillation, which was diagnosed prior to LINA‟s 
issuing the Policy.  As part of the medical treatment for this 
condition, Viera received medication called Coumadin (also 
known as Warfarin).  Coumadin is a prescription oral anti-
coagulant drug prescribed for the prevention and treatment of 
blood clots. 
 Following Viera‟s motorcycle accident, doctors at St. 
Mary‟s made several findings regarding his treatment and 
death.  For example, the Final Assessment made in the 
Emergency Report confirmed that Viera was “on Coumadin 
with therapeutic INR
2
 significantly complicating trauma 
management.”  (App. at 160.)  The Discharge Summary 
prepared by Dr. Michael Bradshaw of St. Mary‟s described 
Viera‟s death as caused by “multiple injuries in a head-on 
motorcycle versus car accident with severe pelvic fractures, 
lower extremity fractures, and a fully coumadinized patient 
due to atrial fibrillation.”  (Id. at 138.) 
 The Certificate of Death confirmed that the immediate 
cause of Viera‟s death was “multiple injuries,” and it 
ambiguously noted that “arteriosclerotic cardiovascular 
disease” was a “condition [] contributing to death but not 
related to [immediate cause].”  (Id. at 227.)   The autopsy 
report, prepared by Robert A. Kurtzman, listed the immediate 
cause of death as “multiple injuries” and listed “other 
                                                 
2
 The International Normalized Ratio (“INR”) 
measures the Coumadin levels in a person‟s blood. 
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significant conditions” including “atrial fibrillation.”  (Id. at 
237.) 
 Plaintiff submitted a claim for benefits under the 
Policy to LINA on November 3, 2008.  LINA denied her 
claim.  Key to this appeal is the language of several Policy 
provisions: 
“Covered Loss”: 
A loss that is all of the following: 
1. the result, directly and independently of 
all other causes, of a Covered Accident; 
2. one of the Covered Losses specified in 
the Schedule of Covered Losses; 
3. suffered by the Covered Person within 
the applicable time period specified in 
the Schedule of Benefits. 
(Id. at 78) (emphasis added). 
“Covered Accident”: 
A sudden, unforeseeable, external event that 
results, directly and independently of all other 
causes, in a Covered Injury or Covered Loss 
and meets all of the following conditions: 
1. occurs while the Covered Person is 
insured under this Policy; 
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2. is not contributed to by disease, 
Sickness, mental or bodily infirmity; 
3. is not otherwise excluded under the 
terms of this Policy. 
(Id.) 
“Proof of Loss”: 
Written or authorized electronic proof of loss 
satisfactory to Us must be given to Us at Our 
office, within 90 days of the loss for which 
claim is made. 
(Id. at 85) (emphasis added). 
 LINA denied Plaintiff‟s claim by finding that the 
specific circumstances of Viera‟s death did not constitute a 
covered event under the terms of the Policy.  Specifically, 
LINA maintained that Viera‟s accident was excluded by the 
“Medical Condition Exclusion” of the Policy, which states 
that: 
[B]enefits will not be paid for any Covered 
Injury or Covered Loss which, directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part, is caused by or 
results from . . . [s]ickness, disease, bodily or 
mental infirmity, bacterial or viral infection or 
medical or surgical treatment thereof, except for 
any bacterial infection resulting from an 
accidental external cut or wound or accidental 
ingestion of contaminated food. 
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(Id. at 83.)  LINA concluded that Viera‟s Coumadin treatment 
complicated his medical treatment and constituted a 
contributing factor to his death.  LINA relied on a report by 
Dr. Mark H. Eaton, a medical doctor it had retained to review 
the accident reports and hospital records.  Dr. Eaton reviewed 
the hospital records, the autopsy report, and the official Death 
Certificate in reaching his conclusion.  Dr. Eaton reported 
that: 
The cause of Mr. Viera‟s death was attributed to 
the traumatic pelvic fracture which resulted in 
clinically significant pelvic and retroperitoneal 
hemorrhage complicated by the fact that the 
claimant was systematically anti-coagulated. . . . 
In my opinion [Viera‟s] Coumadin therapy 
significantly contributed to his death as it is 
more than likely he would have survived the 
traumatic pelvic fracture if he had not been fully 
anti-coagulated at the time of his injury. 
(Id. at 124.)  Plaintiff administratively appealed the denial of 
benefits in a written letter to LINA.  She chose not to 
supplement the record with information supporting her claim 
at that time.  LINA affirmed its decision to deny benefits. 
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 B. Procedural History 
 Plaintiff filed an ERISA action against LINA in the 
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, 
Pennsylvania.  LINA removed the action to the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441.
3
 
 In preparation for the litigation, Plaintiff hired an 
independent expert, Dr. Aaron J. Gindea, to conduct a review 
of the medical records.  Dr. Gindea reported that: 
The hospital staff did everything possible to 
reverse the [Coumadin] effect and limit the 
bleeding.  Although the presence of [Coumadin] 
did make the bleeding worse, it is unreasonable 
to propose that, if not for the [Coumadin], the 
patient likely would have survived.  Therefore, 
the patient‟s death WAS NOT directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part, caused by or 
resulted from the [Coumadin] therapy.  Rather, 
it was the result of severe trauma from a motor 
vehicle accident which would likely have been 
fatal in the presence of or the absence of 
[Coumadin]. 
(Id. at 320-21.) 
                                                 
3
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.  
The District Court granted LINA‟s motion for summary 
judgment, denied Plaintiff‟s motion for summary judgment, 
and directed entry of judgment in favor of LINA.  It found 
that LINA‟s denial of benefits was not an abuse of discretion.  
Plaintiff timely appealed and argues that the District Court 
should have reviewed LINA‟s decision de novo.  In the 
alternative, she asserts that even under a deferential standard 
of review, a genuine issue of material fact exists such that 
summary judgment was inappropriate.  Finally, she argues 
that the District Court misinterpreted the Medical Exclusion 
Provision of the Policy, which she maintains cannot be read 
to include atrial fibrillation or Coumadin treatment. 
II. 
 A district court‟s determination of the proper standard 
to apply in its review of an ERISA plan administrator‟s 
decision is a legal conclusion which we review de novo.  
Grupo Protexa, S.A. v. All Am. Marine Slip, 20 F.3d 1224, 
1231 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 We review a district court‟s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, applying the same standard the district 
court applied.  Alcoa, Inc. v. United States, 509 F.3d 173, 175 
(3d Cir. 2007).  We also review the legal interpretation of 
contractual language de novo.  Heasley v. Belden & Blake 
Corp., 2 F.3d 1249, 1254 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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III. 
A. Standard of Review of LINA’s Benefits 
Denial 
 The Supreme Court has held that “a denial of benefits 
challenged under [ERISA] is to be reviewed under a de novo 
standard unless the benefit plan gives the administrator or 
fiduciary discretionary authority to determine eligibility for 
benefits or to construe the terms of the plan.”  Firestone Tire 
& Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 115 (1989).  If the plan 
gives the administrator or fiduciary discretionary authority to 
make eligibility determinations, we review its decisions under 
an abuse-of-discretion (or arbitrary and capricious) standard.
4
  
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Glenn, 554 U.S. 105, 111 (2008); 
Doroshow v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 574 F.3d 
230, 233 (3d Cir. 2009).  “Whether a plan administrator‟s 
exercise of power is mandatory or discretionary depends upon 
the terms of the plan.”  Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & 
Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1180 (3d Cir. 1991).  
There are no “magic words” determining the scope of judicial 
review of decisions to deny benefits, and discretionary 
powers may be granted expressly or implicitly.  Id.  However, 
when a plan is ambiguous, it is construed in favor of the 
insured.  Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1258.  “The plan administrator 
bears the burden of proving that the arbitrary and capricious 
                                                 
4
 In the ERISA context, an “abuse-of-discretion” 
standard of review is used interchangeably with an “arbitrary 
and capricious” standard of review.  Howley v. Mellon Fin. 
Corp., 625 F.3d 788, 793 n.6 (3d Cir. 2010). 
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standard of review applies.”  Kinstler v. First Reliance Std. 
Life Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 243, 249 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, we may 
overturn an administrator‟s decision only if it is “without 
reason, unsupported by substantial evidence or erroneous as a 
matter of law.”  Miller v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 632 F.3d 837, 
845 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Abnathya v. Hoffmann-La Roche, 
Inc., 2 F.3d 40, 45 (3d Cir. 1993)).  In determining whether 
an administrator abused its discretion, we must consider any 
structural conflict of interest as one of several factors.  Estate 
of Schwing v. The Lilly Health Plan, 562 F.3d 522, 526 (3d 
Cir. 2009). 
 In contrast, if we exercise de novo review, the role of 
the court “is to determine whether the administrator . . . made 
a correct decision.”  Hoover v. Provident Life & Accident Ins. 
Co., 290 F.3d 801, 808-09 (6th Cir. 2002) (alteration in 
original) (quoting Perry v. Simplicity Eng’g, 900 F.2d 963, 
965 (6th Cir. 1990)).  “The administrator‟s decision is 
accorded no deference or presumption of correctness.”  Id. at 
809.  The court must review the record and “determine 
whether the administrator properly interpreted the plan and 
whether the insured was entitled to benefits under the plan.”  
Id. 
 The relevant language at issue in the Policy is the 
“Proof of Loss” provision, which provides: “Written or 
authorized electronic proof of loss satisfactory to Us must be 
given to Us at Our office, within 90 days of the loss for which 
claim is made.”  (App. at 85) (emphasis added).  LINA argues 
that this language confers discretion upon them because they 
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have expressly reserved the right to decide whether the proof 
of loss is satisfactory to them.  Plaintiff argues that the 
language does not expressly and unambiguously confer 
discretion.  Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the language can 
be interpreted in several different ways.
5
  Plaintiff argues that 
the alleged ambiguity should be resolved in her favor and de 
novo review should apply.  The District Court rejected 
Plaintiff‟s argument and held that the “relevant policy 
language presents a clear grant of discretionary authority to 
LINA in deciding whether sufficient proof to support a claim 
has been submitted to shift the Court‟s review from de novo 
to the deferential abuse of discretion standard.”  Viera v. Life 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 2010 WL 1407312, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 6, 
2010).  We disagree. 
 To begin with, we distinguish the language at issue 
here – in particular, the words “proof of loss satisfactory to 
Us” – from language in other plans that requires submission 
of “satisfactory proof,” without reference to who must be 
satisfied.  Most courts of appeals to consider the issue have 
concluded that the mere requirement to submit “satisfactory 
                                                 
5
 LINA makes much of Plaintiff‟s admission before 
the District Court that “[t]his language clearly states that 
LINA shall be the entity determining whether the loss is 
satisfactory to it.”  (App. at 14.)  LINA argues that this 
constitutes a waiver of Plaintiff‟s argument that the language 
is ambiguous and, as such, must be construed against the 
drafter.  This single statement by Plaintiff only establishes, or 
“admits,” that LINA is the decision-maker.  It does not stand 
for a complete concession of the de novo standard. 
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proof” does not confer discretion upon an administrator, and 
thus, does not insulate the administrator from de novo review.  
See, e.g., Perugini-Christen v. Homestead Mortg. Co., 287 
F.3d 624, 626-27 (7th Cir. 2002) (a policy requiring 
“satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [the insurer]” results 
in de novo review); Kearney v. Std. Ins. Co., 175 F.3d 1084, 
1089-90 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (same where policy 
requires “receipt of satisfactory written proof”); Kinstler, 181 
F.3d at 251-52 (same where policy requires insured to 
“submit[] satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [the 
insurer]”). 
On the other hand, courts of appeals interpreting policy 
language requiring submission of “proof of loss satisfactory 
to Us” have reached divergent conclusions, revealing the 
ambiguity inherent in the language.  The United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first appellate court 
to suggest that “satisfactory to us” language may not be 
sufficient to trigger abuse-of-discretion review.  In Kinstler, 
181 F.3d at 252, the court explained: 
[T]he word “satisfactory,” whether in the phrase 
“satisfactory proof” or the phrase “proof 
satisfactory to [the decision-maker]” is an 
inadequate way to convey the idea that a plan 
administrator has discretion.  Every plan that is 
administered requires submission of proof that 
will “satisfy” the administrator.  No plan 
provides benefits when the administrator thinks 
that benefits should not be paid!  Thus, saying 
that proof must be satisfactory “to the 
administrator” merely states the obvious point 
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that the administrator is the decision-maker, at 
least in the first instance.  [Therefore] we 
reiterate that . . . insulation from de novo review 
requires either language stating that the award 
of benefits is within the discretion of the plan 
administrator or language that is plainly the 
functional equivalent of such wording. 
Id. at 252. 
 Shortly thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit squarely held that “satisfactory to us” 
language is insufficient to confer discretion.  In Diaz v. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 424 F.3d 635, 639-40 
(7th Cir. 2005), the court broke from other courts of appeals, 
and its own prior precedent,
6
 by holding that the “satisfactory 
to us” language was no longer sufficient to compel abuse-of-
                                                 
6
 The Seventh Circuit had twice before held that this 
language conferred discretion adequate to yield abuse-of-
discretion review.  See Donato v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 19 
F.3d 375, 379-80 (7th Cir. 1994) (“satisfactory to us” 
sufficiently conferred discretion); Bali v. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield Ass’n, 873 F.2d 1043, 1047 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(“satisfactory to Committee” sufficiently conferred 
discretion).  Therefore, prior to being published, Diaz v. 
Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 424 F.3d 635 (7th Cir. 
2005), was circulated to all active judges under Seventh 
Circuit Rule 40(e) because it changed the way the court 
ascertained the proper standard of review.  No judge voted to 
hear the case en banc. 
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discretion review.  Diaz held that the “critical question is 
whether the plan gives the employee adequate notice that the 
plan administrator is to make a judgment within the confines 
of pre-set standards, or if it has the latitude to shape the 
application, interpretation, and content of the rules in each 
case.”  Id.  Diaz relied on language from Herzberger v. 
Standard Insurance Co., 205 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2000), for the 
proposition that Herzberger changed the course of Seventh 
Circuit jurisprudence on this issue.  In so holding, it 
reaffirmed the safe harbor language it pioneered in 
Herzberger: 
[i]f a plan wishes to insulate its decision to deny 
benefits from plenary review, the surest way to 
do so (at least in this Circuit) is by including 
language that either mimics or is functionally 
equivalent to the “safe harbor” language we 
have suggested: “Benefits under this plan will 
be paid only if the plan administrator decides in 
his discretion that the applicant is entitled to 
them.” 
Diaz, 424 F.3d at 637 (quoting Herzberger, 205 F.3d at 331).  
However, the Diaz court went further than Herzberger by 
holding that “[n]o single phrase such as „satisfactory to us‟ is 
likely to convey enough information to permit the employee 
to distinguish between plans that do and plans that do not 
confer discretion on the administrator.”  Id. at 639. 
 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit followed the footsteps of the Seventh Circuit and held 
that “satisfactory to us” language does not “unambiguously 
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provide discretion to the plan administrator.”  Feibusch v. 
Integrated Device Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 
2006) (applying de novo review).  The Ninth Circuit adopted 
safe harbor language
7
 and explained that the “policy does not 
unambiguously indicate that the plan administrator „has 
authority, power, or discretion to determine eligibility or to 
construe the terms of the Plan, [and therefore] the standard of 
review will be de novo.‟”  Id. at 884 (quoting Sandy v. 
Reliance Std. Life Ins. Co., 222 F.3d 1202, 1207 (9th Cir. 
2000)).  It reasoned that the term “satisfactory to us,” “only 
arguably confer[red] discretion,” and that therefore the 
ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the insured.  Id.  It 
also noted that although it endorsed the safe harbor language, 
it was not requiring “magic words.”  Id. 
 There is, however, a split among our sister courts of 
appeals regarding the impact of the “satisfactory to us” 
language.  In contrast to the courts of appeals for the Second, 
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits, the First, Eighth, and Tenth 
Circuits have held that the “satisfactory to us” language 
confers discretion sufficient to insulate an administrator from 
de novo review.  The First Circuit dealt with similar language 
in Brigham v. Sun Life of Canada, 317 F.3d 72 (1st Cir. 
2003).  The policy at issue provided that the administrator 
“must be provided with such evidence satisfactory to us as we 
may reasonably require under the circumstances.”  Id. at 81 
                                                 
7
 The safe harbor language adopted was: “The plan 
administrator has discretionary authority to grant or deny 
benefits under this plan.”  Feibusch v. Integrated Device 
Tech., Inc., 463 F.3d 880, 883 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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(emphasis in original).  The court noted that “[c]ircuits that 
have considered similar language view the „to us‟ after 
„satisfactory‟ as an indicator of subjective, discretionary 
authority on the part of the administrator, distinguishing such 
phrasing from policies that simply require „satisfactory proof‟ 
of disability, without specifying who must be satisfied.”  Id.  
It concluded that the language “trigger[ed] discretionary 
review.” 8  Id. at 82. 
 Similarly, in Nance v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of 
Canada, 294 F.3d 1263, 1267-68 (10th Cir. 2002), the Tenth 
Circuit held that the policy language adequately conferred 
discretion.  The language at issue in the insurance policy 
required that “[p]roof must be satisfactory to Sun Life” before 
benefits would be paid.  Id. at 1267.  The court was careful to 
“caution [] that plan drafters who wish to convey discretion to 
plan administrators are ill-advised to rely on language that is 
borderline in accomplishing that task.”  Id. at 1268 n.3.  
However, it ultimately held that the “satisfactory to Sun Life” 
language “suffice[d] to convey discretion to Sun Life in 
finding the facts relating to disability.”  Id. at 1268; see also 
Ferrari v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 278 F.3d 801, 806 
(8th Cir. 2002) (a plan sufficiently conferred discretion 
because it “specifie[d] that the employee must provide written 
                                                 
8
 However, the First Circuit also noted that there may 
be “an increasing recognition of the need for the clearest 
signals of administrative discretion.”  Brigham v. Sun Life of 
Can., 317 F.3d 72, 82 (1st Cir. 2003). 
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proof of continued total disability” and “that such proof must 
be satisfactory to [the plan administrator]”).9 
                                                 
9
 Additionally, it appears that the Fourth, Sixth, and 
Eleventh Circuits would hold that “satisfactory to us” 
language confers discretion.  In Gallagher v. Reliance 
Standard Life Insurance Co., the Fourth Circuit held that a 
plan calling for “satisfactory proof ” did not grant discretion 
but explained, in dicta, that had the plan called for “proof of 
… disability that is satisfactory to [the plan administrator]” it 
would require “proof of a total disability that [the plan 
administrator] finds subjectively satisfactory … and [the 
court] would review [the plan administrator‟s] denial of [the 
insured‟s] claim for abuse of discretion.”  305 F.3d 264, 269 
(4th Cir. 2002)  The Sixth Circuit goes further, holding that 
any plan requiring “satisfactory proof” or “satisfactory 
evidence” grants discretion, regardless of whether it specifies 
who must be satisfied or to whom the evidence must be 
submitted.  See Perez v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 150 F.3d 550, 
557 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his „right to require … satisfactory 
evidence‟ means, semantically, that the evidence must be 
satisfactory to [the plan administrator]. …  We therefore 
conclude that the plan clearly grants discretion.”).  The 
Eleventh Circuit seems to follow a similar rule, holding, 
without discussion, that a plan requiring submission of 
“satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [the plan 
administrator] … . gives the administrator discretion to 
determine eligibility for benefits.”  Levinson v. Reliance 
Standard Life Ins., 245 F.3d 1321, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2001); 
see also Tippitt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins., 457 F.3d 1227, 
 19 
 We find the reasoning of the Second, Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits persuasive.  To be insulated from de novo 
review, a plan must “communicate the idea that the 
administrator not only has broad-ranging authority to assess 
compliance with pre-existing criteria, but also has the power 
to interpret the rules, to implement the rules, and even to 
change them entirely.”  Diaz, 424 F.3d at 639.  We agree that 
“[n]o single phrase such as „satisfactory to us‟ is likely to 
convey enough information to permit [an insured] to 
distinguish between plans that do and plans that do not confer 
discretion on the administrator.”  Id. 
 Specifically, the language at issue here “does not alert 
the plan participant to the possibility that [LINA] has the 
power to re-define the entire concept of [a covered loss] on a 
case-by-case basis.”  Id.  Indeed, the only discretion reserved 
by this single phrase, nested within a section wholly 
regarding the procedural requirements for submission of a 
claim, is “the inevitable prerogative to determine what forms 
of proof must be submitted with a claim – something that an 
administrator in even the most tightly restricted plan would 
                                                                                                             
1233-34 (11th Cir. 2006) (explaining that Levinson is the law 
of the Circuit and, therefore, that a plan requiring the insured 
to “submit[] satisfactory proof of Total Disability to [the plan 
administrator]” granted discretion to that administrator). 
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have to do.”10  Id. (emphasis in original).  In other words, it is 
not clear whether “satisfactory to Us” means “electronic 
proof of loss [in a form] satisfactory to Us” or “electronic 
proof of loss [substantively and subjectively] satisfactory to 
Us.”  We resolve this ambiguity in favor of the insured: 
[T]he administrator‟s burden to demonstrate 
insulation from de novo review requires either 
language stating that the award of benefits is 
within the discretion of the plan administrator 
or language that is plainly the functional 
equivalent of such wording.  Since clear 
language can be readily drafted and included in 
policies, even in the context of collectively 
bargained benefit plans when the parties really 
intend to subject claim denials to judicial 
review under a deferential standard, courts 
should require clear language and decline to 
search in semantic swamps for arguable grants 
of discretion. 
                                                 
10
 In this way, the “satisfactory to Us” language in the 
Policy at issue here, which is completely nested within a 
section regarding procedural requirements, is also 
distinguishable from the full sentences at issue in Nance v. 
Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 294 F.3d 1263, 1267 
(10th Cir. 2002) (“Proof must be satisfactory to Sun Life.”), 
and Brigham, 317 F.3d at 81 (“If proof is required, we must 
be provided with such evidence satisfactory to us as we may 
reasonably require under the circumstances.”). 
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Kinstler, 181 F.3d at 252 (emphasis added). 
 If an administrator wishes to insulate its decision to 
deny benefits from de novo review, we suggest that it adopt 
the following “safe harbor” language:  “Benefits under this 
plan will be paid only if the plan administrator decides in [its] 
discretion that the applicant is entitled to them.”  Herzberger, 
205 F.3d at 331.  This is not to say that “magic words” are 
required for a policy to reserve discretion.  See Luby, 944 
F.2d at 1180.  Instead, the Policy at issue here simply does 
not clearly indicate that LINA has discretion to “interpret the 
rules, to implement the rules, and even to change them 
entirely,” and thus the District Court erred in applying abuse-
of-discretion review rather than de novo review to LINA‟s 
decision.  Diaz, 424 F.3d at 639. 
Because we have concluded that a de novo standard of 
review applies, we need not reach Plaintiff‟s argument 
regarding LINA‟s conflict of interest in being both the payor 
and administrator of benefits.  That issue is only pertinent to 
 22 
an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.
11
  On remand, the 
District Court must determine whether LINA properly denied 
Plaintiff recovery under the Policy.  This determination may 
be based on any information before the administrator initially, 
Hoover, 290 F.3d at 809, as well as any supplemental 
evidence, such as Dr. Gindea‟s report.  See, e.g., Luby, 944 
F.2d at 1184-85 (“[A] district court exercising de novo review 
over an ERISA determination between beneficiary claimants 
is not limited to the evidence before the Fund‟s 
administrator.”); Quesinberry v. Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 
F.2d 1017, 1025 (4th Cir. 1993) (district courts have 
discretion during de novo review to consider evidence not 
before administrator); Perry, 900 F.2d at 966 (citing 2 S. 
Childress & M. Davis, Standards of Review § 15.2 (1986)). 
                                                 
11
 We also decline to address Plaintiff‟s argument that 
LINA‟s motion for summary judgment should have been 
denied because a genuine issue of material fact existed.  The 
District Court should have the first opportunity to apply the 
correct standard of review to the facts.  See, e.g., Feisbusch, 
463 F.3d at 886 (remanding); Diaz, 424 F.3d at 640 (same); 
Grosz-Salomon v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1154, 
1162 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Normally, upon discovering that the 
district court used the wrong standard of review in evaluating 
a plan administrator‟s decision to deny benefits, we would 
reverse and remand.”). 
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B. The District Court’s Interpretation of Policy 
Language 
Although we have already determined that the District 
Court erred in applying an abuse-of-discretion standard, we 
consider nonetheless Plaintiff‟s second contention to provide 
guidance to the District Court on remand.  Plaintiff argues 
that the District Court misinterpreted the Policy because the 
Medical Exclusion Provision was ambiguous at best.  
Specifically, she argues that LINA should not be able to apply 
the Exclusion to Viera‟s Coumadin treatment based on a 
canon of statutory construction, the last-antecedent rule, and 
the general maxim that ambiguous contract language should 
be construed against the drafter.
12
  The District Court rejected 
this argument and held that “although a strict application of 
the last-antecedent rule supports Plaintiff‟s interpretation, 
sufficient indicia of contrary meaning exist to overcome this 
maxim of interpretation.”  Viera, 2010 WL 1407312, at *10. 
We review the legal interpretation of contractual 
language de novo.  Heasley, 2 F.3d at 1254.  The last-
antecedent rule is a canon of statutory interpretation, but we 
have extended application of the rule to a life insurance 
policy as well.  See J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co. v. Pilosi, 393 
                                                 
12
 Plaintiff also argued before the District Court that 
summary judgment should be granted in its favor because 
LINA waived its right to exclude coverage because it had 
notice of Viera‟s atrial fibrillation condition prior to issuing 
the Policy.  (App. at 23.)  The District Court rejected this 
argument, and Plaintiff does not appeal it. 
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F.3d 356, 365-66 (3d Cir. 2004).  The rule provides “that 
qualifying words, phrases, and clauses are to be applied to the 
words or phrase immediately preceding and not to others 
more remote.”  Stepnowski v. C.I.R., 456 F.3d 320, 324 (3d 
Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 
436 (3d Cir. 2003)).  In other words, if a sentence reads “A or 
B with respect to C,” it should be interpreted as containing 
two items:  (1) “A” and (2) “B with respect to C.”  Id. at 324 
n.7.  However, the last-antecedent rule “is not an absolute and 
can assuredly be overcome by other indicia of meaning.”  
Pilosi, 393 F.3d at 365 (quoting Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 
U.S. 20, 26 (2003)). 
The Medical Exclusion Provision at issue states: 
[B]enefits will not be paid for any Covered 
Injury or Covered Loss which, directly or 
indirectly, in whole or in part, is caused by or 
results from . . . [s]ickness, disease, bodily or 
mental infirmity, bacterial or viral infection or 
medical or surgical treatment thereof, except for 
any bacterial infection resulting from an 
accidental external cut or wound or accidental 
ingestion of contaminated food. 
(App. at 83.)  Plaintiff argues that the placement of the 
comma immediately preceding the term “bacterial or viral 
infection” suggests that the term “medical or surgical 
treatment thereof” would not be extended to the other terms 
“sickness, disease, bodily or mental infirmity.”  In other 
words, Plaintiff contends that the Policy excludes coverage 
only for “medical treatment” of “bacterial or viral 
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infection[s]” and does not exclude coverage for “medical 
treatment” of “bodily infirmities” like atrial fibrillation.  The 
District Court agreed with Plaintiff‟s literal application of the 
last-antecedent rule.  However, the District Court ultimately 
concluded that there were sufficient indicia of meaning that 
contradicted Plaintiff‟s interpretation.  Specifically, the 
District Court pointed out that: 
(1) the term “Covered Accident” does not 
include an injury or accident “contributed to by 
disease, Sickness, mental or bodily infirmity”; 
(2) the cover page of the [] Policy states that it 
is a “group accident” policy and “does not pay 
benefits for loss caused by sickness;” and 
(3) the scope of the [] Policy deals with 
“accidental death and dismemberment.” 
Viera, 2010 WL 1407312, at *10.  The District Court 
appropriately looked to and analyzed the indicia of meaning 
in the Policy so as not to “contort the language beyond its 
limits.”  Pilosi, 393 F.3d at 365.  Where the meaning of the 
contract language is clear, the last-antecedent rule should not 
be used to create ambiguity. 
 Plaintiff also argues that the inherent ambiguity in the 
plan must be construed against LINA under the doctrine of 
contra proferentem.  “Whether an ambiguity exists is a 
question of law.” 12th St. Gym, Inc. v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 
93 F.3d 1158, 1165 (3d Cir. 1996).  Under Pennsylvania law, 
an insurance contract is ambiguous where it:  “(1) is 
reasonably susceptible to different constructions, (2) is 
obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expression, or 
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(3) has a double meaning.”13  Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 
F.3d 159, 163 (3d Cir. 2002).  To be sure, we must construe 
ambiguous policy provisions against the drafter of the 
contract once a determination of ambiguity has been made, 
but the language at issue here is not ambiguous.  Pilosi, 393 
F.3d at 363; 12th St. Gym, 93 F.3d at 1166. 
As noted above, Plaintiff‟s alternative reading of the 
provision under the last-antecedent rule is not reasonable.  
“Disagreement between the parties over the proper 
interpretation of a contract does not necessarily mean that a 
contract is ambiguous.”  12th St. Gym, 93 F.3d at 1165.  
Where there is only one reasonable interpretation of a 
contract, that interpretation controls because 
“[s]traightforward language in an insurance policy should be 
given its natural meaning.”  Lawson, 301 F.3d at 162.  The 
District Court correctly interpreted the Medical Exclusion 
Provision. 
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse in part, 
affirm in part, and remand to the District Court for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                 
13
 Neither party disputes that Pennsylvania law applies 
here. 
